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Merriam-Webster.com reported a 495,000 percent increase in searches for
this French phrase, meaning “for lack of something better,” on June 27,
2016. Faute de mieux, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/news-trend-watch/faute-de-mieux-2016-06-27
[https://perma.cc/GLP7-4CWJ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). That
morning, the Supreme Court announced its 5-3 decision in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). In her concurring
opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used the phrase in reference to the
desperate and risky measures that women resort to when restrictions that
limit access to safe and legal abortion present them with no other options.
Id. at 2321.
Although this Note focuses on Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, it is
worth noting that Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, in and of itself, seems
to acknowledge the compromises and ambiguities of the majority opinion.
Perhaps in anticipation of attempts to find ways around the decision, her
concurrence supplements the majority’s analysis with strong statements
regarding the safety of abortion, supported by the findings of numerous
studies, and rejects the idea that Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers (“TRAP”) laws could ever pass constitutional muster under the
undue-burden standard. See id. at 2320–21.
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Introduction
Already a mother of two, Valerie Peterson wanted another child
but had been “told [for years that she] couldn’t have any more
children.”2 Then, in 2015, Peterson received some shocking news: she
was pregnant. Unfortunately, her happiness turned to devastation when
her sixteen-week sonogram revealed that the fetus’s brain and spinal
cord had not developed properly. Peterson decided to terminate her
pregnancy, rather than wait to miscarry or deliver a stillborn fetus.3
However, after the Texas legislature passed numerous onerous abortion
regulations in 2013 through House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”),4 more than half of
the state’s abortion clinics were forced to close, and Peterson’s doctor
struggled to find her a timely appointment at a nearby facility.5 As a
result, Peterson decided to travel to Florida, a state with less restrictive
abortion laws, where she was able to promptly receive the care she
needed. The combined cost of the procedure and the trip was “close to
$5,000,” a price that Peterson realized many women could not afford.6
2.

Valerie Peterson, How Did I Get an Abortion in Texas? I Didn’t., N.Y.
Times (June 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/opinion/
how-did-i-get-an-abortion-in-texas-i-didnt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
QU94-3RJ3].

3.

Peterson, supra note 2.

4.

H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2d Called Sess. (Tex. 2013).

5.

Peterson, supra note 2.

6.

Id.
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Less than a year later, the Supreme Court struck down two of H.B.
2’s provisions in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,7 after finding
that “neither . . . confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the
burdens upon [abortion] access that each imposes.”8 The “admittingprivileges requirement,” which had forced the closure of nineteen of the
state’s forty-one clinics,9 required “[a] physician performing or inducing
an abortion . . . [to], on the date the abortion is performed or induced,
have active admitting privileges at a hospital that . . . is located not
further than 30 miles from the location at which the abortion is
performed or induced.”10 The “surgical-center requirement,” which
threatened to close fourteen to fifteen more clinics if allowed to go into
effect,11 required abortion clinics to meet “the minimum standards
adopted under [the Texas Health and Safety Code] for ambulatory
surgical centers.”12 After carefully analyzing relevant data and studies
and weighing the restrictions’ benefits and burdens, the Court held that
both provisions unconstitutionally imposed an undue burden on the
right to abortion.13
Reproductive rights advocates celebrated the victory, and many
deemed the majority’s careful consideration of public health and
medical evidence a “win” for “science.”14 Some commentators have even
7.

136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).

8.

Id. at 2300 (striking down Texas’s admitting-privileges requirement and
surgical-center requirement).

9.

Daniel Grossman et al., Change in Abortion Services After
Implementation of a Restrictive Law in Texas, 90 Contraception 496,
498 (2014); see also Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312. After
H.B. 2 was enacted but before any of its provisions went into effect,
“[e]ight clinics closed or stopped providing abortions.” On the day that
the first three provisions went into effect, “11 [more] clinics closed or
stopped providing abortions, leaving 22 open facilities.” Grossman et al.,
supra, at 498. The Whole Woman’s Health majority accepted the district
court’s factual finding that the admitting-privileges provision caused these
closures, based on “direct testimony as well as plausible inferences to be
drawn from the timing of the clinic closures.” 136 S. Ct. at 2313.

10.

Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (quoting Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 171.0031(a) (West 2015)).

11.

Id. at 2316 (noting that the parties stipulated to these numbers).

12.

Id. at 2300 (quoting Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 245.010(a)).

13.

Id. at 2311–13, 2318.

14.

See, e.g., Alex DiBranco, Whole Woman’s Health’s Unexpected Win for
Science, The Public Eye, Fall 2016, at 17, http://www.politicalresearch.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/PE_Fall16_DiBranco.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Y59J-FGQD]; Bixby Center for Global Reproductive Health,
A Victory for the Role of Evidence in Reproductive Health Care,
https://bixbycenter.ucsf.edu/news/victory-role-evidence-reproductivehealth-care [https://perma.cc/F3LA-TQYR] (last visited Dec. 13, 2018);
see also Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole
Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s
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suggested that this decision will greatly limit states’ ability to restrict
abortion access without the support of scientific or other empirical
evidence going forward.15 Others hailed Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion for breathing life back into the standard of review applied to
abortion restrictions, which had seemingly devolved into little more
than rational-basis review.16
Despite this high praise, many questions remain about the impact
the Whole Woman’s Health decision will ultimately have on future
challenges to anti-abortion laws, including those purportedly enacted in
the interest of protecting women’s17 health (“woman-protective
abortion restrictions”),18 and those that purport to advance the
government’s interest in protecting fetal life (“fetal-protective
restrictions”).19 While recognizing the aspects of the decision that
Health, 126 Yale L.J. Forum 149, 159–61 (2016) (discussing future
applications of the Whole Woman’s Health majority’s careful scrutiny of
scientific evidence to other purportedly health-related abortion
restrictions).
15.

See, e.g., Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 14, at 157–58; DiBranco, supra
note 14, at 19; Imani Gandy, After ‘Whole Woman’s Health’ Decision,
Advocates Should Fight Ultrasound Laws With Science, Rewire (July 29,
2016, 2:41 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2016/07/29/whole-womanshealth-ultrasound-laws-science/ [https://perma.cc/77YN-9FGX].

16.

See generally Fourteenth Amendment—Due Process Clause—Undue
Burden: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 397
(2016).

17.

Although the word “women” and female pronouns are used throughout
this Note—reflecting the language used by courts in abortion-related
decisions—the author acknowledges that these terms can have the effect
of erasing the experiences of transgender and non-binary individuals, who
are often left out of conversations about abortion rights. Transgender and
non-binary people have abortions and are harmed by abortion restrictions.
See, e.g., Key Facts on Abortion, Amnesty Int’l, https://www.amnesty.
org/en/what-we-do/sexual-and-reproductive-rights/abortion-facts/ [https://
perma.cc/38NL-W7HK] (last visited Dec. 16, 2018). Furthermore, clinics
that perform abortions often also provide transgender health services, and
their closure can have serious consequences outside of abortion access for
those relying on these services. See, e.g., Chanel Dubofsky, Why Trans
and Non-Binary People Must Be Included in the Abortion Conversation,
HelloFlo (Feb. 23, 2018), http://helloflo.com/trans-and-non-binaryfolks-must-be-part-of-conversations-about-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/
CLL5-TNV3].

18.

Reva Siegal coined the term “woman-protective abortion restrictions” in
her 2007 article about these restrictions. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics
of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion
Restrictions, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 991 (2007). To be clear, the use of this
term throughout this Note in no way implies an assumption that the
restrictions actually have the purpose or effect of benefiting women.

19.

See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion Law, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77,
78 (2017) (noting that “Whole Woman’s Health set the stage for fact-
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seemingly fortified the constitutional right to abortion access, this Note
demonstrates how ambiguities in the majority opinion have made the
decision incredibly vulnerable to manipulation by unsympathetic lower
courts. This Note also identifies potential pitfalls that advocates will
need to address in future challenges, and it suggests ways of dealing
with some of those pitfalls through a careful reading of Whole Woman’s
Health.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the evolution of abortion
jurisprudence in the United States. Part II critically evaluates the
Whole Woman’s Health majority’s analysis of the “benefits prong” of
the undue-burden balancing test. Part III engages in a similar analysis
of the “burdens prong.” Part IV dissects some of the decision’s
ambiguities, which raise questions regarding the correct application of
the standard of review in future challenges of abortion restrictions.

I. Evolution of Abortion Jurisprudence: From Roe to
Whole Woman’s Health
A. Recognizing a Constitutional Right to Abortion and Adopting the
Trimester Framework

In Roe v. Wade,20 the Supreme Court held that the substantive due
process right to privacy encompasses a woman’s right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy. However, the Court determined that this
right is not unlimited, recognizing as valid state interests in protecting
women’s health and potential human life.21 Citing medical evidence
demonstrating that first trimester abortions are safer than childbirth,
the Court determined that states could regulate abortion for the
purpose of protecting women’s health only after the first trimester.22
The Court held that states’ interest in potential life became compelling
after the point of fetal viability,23 which medical evidence suggested
could occur as early as twenty-four weeks into a pregnancy.24
Accordingly, the Court held that states could regulate or ban abortion
for the purpose of protecting fetal life during the third trimester,

intensive litigation about the benefits and burdens of measures restricting
access to abortion,” and “could provide far less reliable protection for
abortion rights than might appear”); R. Alta Charo, Whole Women’s
Victory—or Not?, 375 New Eng. J. Med. 809 (2016).
20.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

21.

Id. at 162–63.

22.

Id. at 163.

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 160.
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“except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother.”25
Justice Blackmun’s opinion outlined some of the potential negative
impacts of forced pregnancy and forced motherhood, including tolls on
a woman’s mental and physical health, economic burdens, and stigma.26
However, the opinion has been criticized for failing to “identif[y] the
ways in which laws restricting abortion are inherently discriminatory
[against women].”27
Roe has also been criticized for relying almost entirely on empirical
evidence to support drawing a line at viability, while failing to analyze
“the constitutional principles that directed the choice of the particular
line drawn.”28 Without a constitutional justification, commentators
25.

Id. at 163–64.

26.

Justice Blackmun asserted:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
Id. at 153.
Interestingly, while the opinion contained ample citations to medical
evidence and scientific studies, Blackmun did not cite any social science
or other evidence in support these particular conclusions. In fact, “neither
the Supreme Court nor the district court made any references to social
science literature in any of the opinions written for Roe v. Wade.”
Rosemary J. Erickson & Rita J. Simon, The Use of Social Science
Data in Supreme Court Decisions 43 (1998). However, “considerable
social science material was brought before the Court in the combined cases
of Roe and Doe” through briefs. Id. at 44. Blackmun also may have come
across evidence of these harms in his independent research.

27.

Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private
Choice, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1189, 1211–12 (2017). Chemerinsky and
Goodwin argue that Roe would have been a stronger decision if it had
included the description of abortion restrictions’ discriminatory
assumptions and impact that Blackmun wrote almost twenty years later
in his Casey concurrence. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928–29 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)).

28.

Steven R. Schlesinger & Janet Nesse, Justice Harry Blackmun and
Empirical Jurisprudence, 29 Am. U. L. Rev. 405, 427 (1980) (emphasis
added); see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology:
Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 Yale L.J. 639, 643 (1986) (“The abortion
framework in Roe had . . . important underpinnings that were not
articulated explicitly—mainly, the assumption that a viable fetus was one
that was substantially developed and had reached ‘late’ gestation, and the
ethical precept that late in gestation a fetus is so like a baby that elective
abortion can be forbidden.”).
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have long expressed concern that a woman’s right to choose will erode
with advances in medical technology that push the point of viability
earlier and earlier.29
B. Undoing Roe’s Trimester Framework

Following Roe, the Court struck down numerous abortion
restrictions under the trimester framework. In City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health (Akron I),30 for example, the Court
struck down multiple provisions of an Akron, Ohio, ordinance,
including, among others, a requirement that abortions be performed in
hospitals after the first trimester, “informed-consent” requirements, and
a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period after signing a consent
form.31 Some of these regulations represented an organized effort by the
anti-abortion movement to pass abortion restrictions justified by largely
unsubstantiated claims regarding the risks abortion posed to women’s
mental and physical health.32 The informed-consent provision
challenged in Akron I required physicians to tell their patients that:
[A]bortion is a major surgical procedure which can result in
serious complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus,
infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and
prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and . . . abortion may
leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing
psychological problems [a woman] may have, and can result in
severe emotional disturbances.33

Reproductive rights advocates provided evidence “refut[ing] the
factual arguments supporting the ordinance,” including psychological
studies that found no connection between abortion and adverse
psychological outcomes.34
In striking down the ordinance, the Court rejected the medical and
psychological claims made in support of the restrictions and noted that
“the safety of second-trimester abortions ha[d] increased dramatically”
since the Court decided Roe v. Wade.35 Justice O’Connor dissented,
29.

See, e.g., Schlesinger & Nesse, supra note 28, at 427 (“[E]ach time medical
science advances the point of viability, the state’s compelling interest in
protection of fetal life will encroach further upon the woman’s rights to
privacy and reproductive autonomy.”).

30.

462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).

31.

Id. at 422–24, 426, 452.

32.

Ziegler, supra note 19, at 83–84.

33.

Akron I, 462 U.S. at 423 n.5 (quoting Akron Ordinance No. 60-1978
§ 1870.06).

34.

Ziegler, supra note 19, at 85.

35.

Akron I, 462 U.S. at 435–36, 444–45.
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criticizing the trimester framework and the limitations it placed on the
government’s ability to advance its interest in protecting fetal life, and
raising the idea of a more deferential “undue burden” analysis.36
Undeterred by Akron I, abortion opponents continued their efforts
to disseminate the idea that abortion has negative psychological
consequences and began to strategically manufacture an evidentiary
basis for this claim.37 These efforts eventually paid off.
A shift in the make-up of the Court called the future of Roe and
the constitutional right to abortion into question. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,38 the Court upheld a Missouri statute
prohibiting abortion and related research in public facilities,39 defining
the beginning of life at the point of conception, and requiring physicians
to test for fetal viability before performing an abortion twenty weeks
or later into a woman’s pregnancy. Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued in his plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices White and

36.

Id. at 459–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

37.

See Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion
Jurisprudence, 41 Am. J.L. & Med. 85, 97–98 (2015); Ziegler, supra note
19, at 89–90. Mary Ziegler provides an insightful discussion of the
inception of this strategy:
Movement leaders argued for the creation of research
organizations that could collect proof that abortion hurt women
and convince key decision makers, particularly politicians, that
legal abortion did more harm than good. Victor Rosenblum and
Thomas Marzen of [Americans United for Life] claimed that the
movement might have more success promoting laws that
supposedly benefited women if pro-lifers could popularize enough
“[f]avorable statistical data.” As the two explained:
“Accepted medical practices” must change before
barriers to reversal can be broken down; whether or
not abortion is “acceptable” is determined by the
view and customary practices of the very people who
perform abortions. They are unwilling to increase
the state’s authority to regulate abortion. A possible
long-term approach to meeting this dilemma is the
development of new sources for abortion data.
Creating new research organizations would allow abortion
opponents to more confidently make claims about the facts. As
importantly, even if the courts did not buy the movement’s factual
claims, abortion opponents could work through politics to create
enough scientific uncertainty about what “accepted medical
practices” should involve.
Ziegler, supra note 19, at 90.

38.

492 U.S. 490 (1989).

39.

Id. at 509. This prohibition included a health exception. Id. at 501.
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Kennedy, that Roe’s trimester framework had “proved ‘unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice.’”40
Although after Webster it appeared that the Court would overturn
Roe, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,41
the Supreme Court surprisingly reaffirmed Roe’s “central holding” that
“the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
effective right to elect the procedure.”42 The controlling plurality
decision, however, replaced Roe’s trimester framework with a new
“undue burden” standard.43 Under this standard, states are permitted
to pass pre-viability abortion restrictions that promote their recognized
interests in protecting the health of the mother or protecting potential
life, so long as the restrictions do not impose an “undue burden” on a
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. However, “a statute
which, while furthering [a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”44 The
Court further explained that “[u]nnecessary health regulations that
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”45
Applying this new standard, the plurality upheld all but one of the
challenged abortion restrictions. Citing numerous studies and expert
testimony on domestic abuse, the plurality struck down Pennsylvania’s
spousal-notice requirement.46 In response to the state’s contention that
the requirement “imposes almost no burden at all for the vast majority
of women seeking abortions,” the Court advised that “[t]he analysis
does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute
operates; it begins there.”47 Based on the empirical evidence in the
record, the plurality held that the requirement was an undue burden
because “in a large fraction of the cases in which [the requirement] is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice

40.

Id. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 546 (1985)).

41.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

42.

Id. at 845–46.

43.

Id. at 873, 876.

44.

Id. at 877.

45.

Id. at 878.

46.

Id. at 888–94.

47.

Id. at 894. The Court further specified that the restriction’s “real target
is narrower even than the class of women seeking abortions identified by
the State: it is married women seeking abortions who do not wish to notify
their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of the
statutory exceptions to the notice requirement.” Id. at 895.
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to undergo an abortion.”48 This language was subsequently interpreted
as an articulation of the correct test for determining whether the facial
invalidation of a challenged abortion restriction is proper.49
In contrast, the Court upheld a parental-notice requirement, clinicreporting requirements, and an informed consent requirement similar
to the one it struck down in Akron I that required women to receive
information about abortion’s supposed mental health risks at least
twenty-four hours before they underwent the procedure, overruling this
aspect of the Akron I decision.50 Amici briefs submitted in support of
the Pennsylvania restrictions “presented the very possibility of
postabortion trauma as a justification for abortion restrictions” and
“suggested that the questions remained too open to expose women to
the risk of harm.”51 The trial court found that the testimony presented
in support of these claims lacked credibility.52 However, in holding that
the restrictions furthered Pennsylvania’s woman-protective interests,
the Supreme Court ignored both the trial court’s assessment and the
empirical evidence presented by the challengers and amici showing a
lack of causal connection between abortion and mental health problems:
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of
health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers
the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may
elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed. If the information the State requires to be made
available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the
requirement may be permissible.53

The Court cited no evidence in support of these supposedly indisputable
assumptions.
The district court had found that the twenty-four-hour waiting
period requirement would likely delay a woman’s ability to obtain an
abortion by forcing her to make two separate visits to an abortion
provider. The resulting increase in travel distance, time, and cost would
be particularly burdensome on “those women who have the fewest
financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who
48.

Id. at 895, 925.

49.

See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.

50.

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, at 881–87.

51.

Ziegler, supra note 19, at 96 (emphasis added).

52.

Id. at 97.

53.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or
others.”54 The Casey plurality accepted these findings but held that
these burdens did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under
the new undue-burden standard.55 According to the Court, “[n]ot all
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will
be undue.”56
C. Stenberg and Gonzales

In Stenberg v. Carhart,57 the Court struck down a Nebraska law
banning so-called “partial birth abortions” (commonly referred to as
dilation and extraction, or “D&X” abortions, by medical professionals)
for two independent reasons.58 The Court held that the ban placed an
undue burden on the substantive due process right to abortion because
the statutory language was broad enough to also encompass the most
common method of abortion after the first trimester (called dilation and
evacuation, or “D&E”).59 The Court also held that the law was
unconstitutional due to its lack of a health exception.60 Although the
Court was presented with contrary testimony regarding the existence
of situations in which D&X would be safer than D&E, the Court found
that “the division of medical opinion about the matter at most means
uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its absence.”61
In response to the Stenberg decision, Congress passed a federal
“partial birth abortion” ban, which used more specific language to
describe the banned procedure but still omitted a health exception.62
The Supreme Court upheld this law in Gonzales v. Carhart.63 Despite
its contrary holding in Stenberg, the Court declined to invalidate the
statute on its face for lacking a health exception, but left open the
possibility of an as-applied challenge. The Court differentiated the
federal law from the one it struck down in Stenberg, finding that the
54.

Id. at 885–86 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp.
1323, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).

55.

Id. at 886. The Court noted that the district court invalidated the waiting
period requirement after applying strict scrutiny, and “did not conclude
that the increased costs and potential delays amount[ed] to substantial
obstacles.” Id. Of course, the district court could not have been expected
to apply a standard that the Court had not yet articulated.

56.

Id. at 876.

57.

530 U.S. 914 (2000).

58.

Id. at 927, 930.

59.

Id. at 938–39, 945–46.

60.

Id. at 937–38.

61.

Id. at 937.

62.

Partial-Birth Abortion Plan Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2019).

63.

550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007).
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statutory language adequately distinguished D&X from D&E and only
proscribed the former method.64
The Court accepted the purposes of the law that Congress set forth
in the legislative findings, which the Court characterized as
“express[ing] respect for the dignity of human life” and “protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”65 The majority found
that the D&X ban furthered these objectives by creating a “dialogue
that better informs the political and legal systems, the medical
profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the
consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion.”66
The Court then concluded that “it is a reasonable inference” that this
“dialogue” could “encourage some women to carry the infant to full
term, thus reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions” and
may encourage “[t]he medical profession . . . [to] find different and less
shocking methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester, thereby
accommodating legislative demand.”67 The Court rejected the argument
that D&E could be considered equally or more “brutal” than D&X,
finding that Congress was reasonable in singling out D&X because of
similarities Congress saw between D&X and the “delivery process.”68
The Court also recognized a “woman-protective” governmental
interest in banning D&X. Citing an amicus brief recounting the
personal experiences of individual women after having an abortion,
Justice Kennedy asserted that “it seems unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they
once created and sustained,” potentially leading to “[s]evere depression
and loss of esteem,” but Justice Kennedy admitted that the Court
“f[ou]nd no reliable data to measure the phenomenon.”69 The majority
also found that most physicians did not describe the D&X procedure to
their patients and declared that women would experience psychological
harm if they learned about the procedure after it was performed.70 In
sum, it determined that the ban furthered the government’s “interest
in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.”71

64.

Id. at 150–56.

65.

Id. at 157.

66.

Id. at 160.

67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380)).

70.

Id. at 159–60. Once again, Justice Kennedy supported this claim with no
evidence, declaring that this alleged harm was “self-evident.” Id. at 159.

71.

Id. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s
unsupported assertion regarding the risk of psychological consequences, as
well as the Court’s approval of a “solution” that “deprives women of the

1018

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019
Faute de Mieux

When analyzing the burden imposed by the ban, the Court was
faced with contradictory evidence regarding the relative safety of D&X
in comparison to D&E, both generally and under specific
circumstances.72 Rather than view this medical uncertainty as a reason
to invalidate the law, as the Court had seven years earlier in Stenberg,
the Court held that “medical uncertainty over whether the [law’s]
prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to
conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue
burden.”73 Furthermore, in determining that the “facial attacks should
not have been entertained,” the Court echoed the “large fraction”
language used in Casey’s facial invalidation of the spousal-notice
requirement.74
D. Ambiguities and Circuit Splits in the Wake of Casey and Gonzales

The Court’s decisions in Casey and Gonzales inspired differing
interpretations of the correct application of the undue-burden test.75
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, along with various district courts,
applied a balancing test, “weigh[ing] the burdens against the state’s
justification, [and] asking whether and to what extent the challenged
regulation actually advances the state’s interests. If a burden
significantly exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s interests,
it is ‘undue,’ which is to say unconstitutional.”76 Courts applying this
approach considered evidence outside of the legislative record in
analyzing both the benefits of a challenged regulation in relation to the
purported governmental interest in its passing, as well as the actual or
anticipated burdens the regulation places on the exercise of the abortion
right.77
In contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits declined to apply
a balancing test, instead engaging in a more deferential two-part

right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”
Id. at 183–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72.

Id. at 161–63.

73.

Id. at 164.

74.

Id. at 167–68 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 at 895 (1992)) (noting that the “respondents ha[d] not demonstrated
that the Act would be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant
cases”).

75.

Gillian Metzger, Symposium: Hanging in the Balance, SCOTUSblog (Jan.
6, 2016, 9:23 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/symposiumhanging-in-the-balance/ [https://perma.cc/SN6E-FEY5].

76.

Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 919–20 (7th
Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Planned
Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014)).

77.

See, e.g., id.; Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d
786, 790–93 (7th Cir. 2013).
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analysis.78 When considering a challenge to an abortion restriction,
these courts determined whether the restriction satisfied rational-basis
review, and then determined whether the restriction had the purpose
or effect of creating a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.79
Under this test, restrictions were upheld as long as they did not create
a substantial obstacle and were rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. Because “the rational basis test seeks only to
determine whether any conceivable rationale [for enacting a regulation]
exists,” these courts argued that it is not the judiciary’s role to
independently evaluate the extent to which a regulation actually
furthers a legitimate governmental interest.80
Casey’s ambiguous “large fraction test” also proved difficult for
courts to apply and has been interpreted inconsistently. Numerous
courts have interpreted this language as imposing a distinct test for
determining whether facial challenges to abortion regulations could be
sustained, which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the regulation
was unduly burdensome in a large fraction of relevant cases.81 Courts
have struggled to define the appropriate numerator and denominator
78.

See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 2014)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v.
Abbott (Abbott II), 748 F.3d 583, 593–94, 597 (5th Cir. 2014)), vacated
in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014); Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v.
DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2012); Greenville Women’s Clinic
v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000); and Women’s Health Ctr. of W.
Cnty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1989)); see also Metzger,
supra note 75.

79.

Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297 (citing Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 593–94, 597). As
Justice Thomas argues in his Whole Woman’s Health dissent, this
interpretation stems from language used by the majority in Gonzales.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007)). In
upholding the federal ban on the D&X procedure, the Gonzales majority
asserted that “[w]here [the legislature] has a rational basis to act, and it
does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power
to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its
legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to
promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.” 550 U.S. at 158.

80.

Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594.

81.

For example, in Gonzales, the majority acknowledged the existing
confusion over the required showing for sustaining a facial challenge. The
majority cited two possible tests: a facial challenge could be sustained by
showing that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged
law] would be valid,” or a facial challenge could be sustained by
demonstrating that the “statute would impose an undue burden ‘in a large
fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant.’” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895
(1992); also citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502,
514 (1990)). The Court did not see the need to resolve the issue because
it found that the petitioners did not meet the latter standard. Id. at 167–
68.
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for this calculation, leading to widely ranging outcomes. The district
court opinion in Cincinnati Women’s Services, Inc. v. Taft82 provided
an on-point summary of the difficult questions raised by the rule:
The “large fraction” standard enunciated in Casey by nature
invites the courts and the parties to engage in a numbercrunching exercise to assess the impact of an abortion
regulation. . . . Nevertheless, stating that a “large fraction”
constitutes a substantial obstacle is not the same thing as defining
a “large fraction.” Because the Supreme Court instructs that the
constitutional analysis should focus on only those women for
whom the restriction is actually relevant, the argument devolves
to which group of women is properly considered the numerator
and which group of women is properly considered the
denominator. Even if a court properly identifies the numerator
and denominator, it still must decide whether the resulting
fraction is “large.” Again, the Casey Court provides no real
guidance.83

These ambiguities allowed the test to be manipulated in order to
reach a desired result, particularly by defining the denominator more
narrowly or broadly.84
Questions about the application of both of these tests, as well as
other disputed interpretations of Gonzales, played a considerable role
in Whole Woman’s Health.
E. TRAP Laws and Whole Woman’s Health

After the Supreme Court in Casey recognized a pre-viability
governmental interest in regulating abortion to protect women’s health,
one of the major legislative strategies put forth by anti-abortion
advocacy groups, including Americans United for Life (“AUL”), focused
on undermining the constitutional right to abortion by “subjecting
abortion to increasingly burdensome forms of regulation.”85 These
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (“TRAP”) laws, as critics
call them, impose regulations on abortion providers that are difficult
and expensive to comply with, are unsupported by health and safety
principles, and typically are not imposed on other healthcare procedures

82.

468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006).

83.

Id. at 377–78 (Rogers, J., concurring) (quoting Cincinnati Women’s
Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 466 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2005)) (internal
citation omitted).

84.

See id. at 376–77.

85.

Cary Franklin, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and What It Means
to Protect Women, Reproductive Rights and Justice Stories
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3) (available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3206983).
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with comparable or greater risks.86 These laws increase costs for
abortion providers and can lead to widespread clinic closures.87 While
the purpose of model TRAP laws written by organizations like AUL is
to undermine Roe and decrease abortion access, the carefully
constructed legislative messaging alleges that the primary goal of the
regulations is to “safeguard maternal health—to protect pregnant
women from dangerous providers and to ensure that abortion is
performed in safe environments.”88 Advocates of this strategy “argued
that legislators ought to be given wide latitude” to enact regulations
that purport to further that goal.89
The efforts to restrict abortion access through strategic regulation
picked up speed following the 2010 midterm elections, as “scores of Tea
Party and other conservative candidates for whom ending abortion was
a key priority” entered office.90 Texas’s passage of H.B. 2 in 2013
reflected these national trends.91
The constitutionality of H.B. 2’s admitting-privileges requirement
was first challenged by several abortion clinics and providers, who
sought a facial invalidation of the requirement in Planned Parenthood
of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott.92 The district court
preliminarily enjoined the requirement, but the Fifth Circuit vacated
this injunction, allowing the requirement to go into effect.93 After the
issue was tried in full, the district court permanently enjoined the
admitting-privileges provision, holding that it unduly burdened Texas
women seeking an abortion.94 The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower
court’s decision as to the admitting-privileges requirement, upholding
it as constitutional, in part because it found the plaintiffs did not
sufficiently “show that abortion practitioners will likely be unable to
comply with the privileges requirement.”95
86.

Id. (manuscript at 4).

87.

See id.

88.

Id. (manuscript at 3–4) (emphasis in original).

89.

Id. (manuscript at 4).

90.

Id. (manuscript at 5).

91.

Id.

92.

951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (W.D. Tex. 2013).

93.

Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott
(Abbott I), 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs also challenged
H.B. 2’s restrictions on medication abortions. Id. at 409.

94.

Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 909 (W.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
and remanded, Abbot II, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).

95.

Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 592, 598. The plaintiffs did not file a petition for
certiorari. Some of the plaintiffs, however, joined a separate challenge
brought shortly after this decision was announced. See infra note 97 and
accompanying text.
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In the time between the Fifth Circuit’s decision vacating the
injunction and its decision upholding the restriction, nineteen of Texas’s
abortion clinics had closed: eight in anticipation of the admittingprivileges requirement taking effect and eleven more on the day that
requirement officially took effect.96 Soon after the Fifth Circuit
published its decision, another group of abortion clinics and providers—
including some of the plaintiffs from Abbott I—challenged H.B. 2’s
admitting-privileges requirement as it applied to two Texas clinics in
McAllen and El Paso. They also brought a facial challenge of the
constitutionality
of
the
ambulatory-surgical-center
(“ASC”)
requirement.97 After a four-day bench trial, the district court found that
the two provisions had the combined effect of shuttering most of the
abortion clinics in Texas.98 The district court permanently enjoined the
enforcement of both challenged restrictions, holding that “the over-all
effect of the provisions is to create an impermissible obstacle as applied
to all women seeking a previability abortion.”99
Once again, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision.100 Applying the two-step, rational basis/substantial obstacle
analysis, the court held that the challenged restrictions were
constitutional, except as applied to the McAllen clinic.101 The court
determined that both of the challenged requirements “were rationally
related to a legitimate state interest” in raising “the standard and
quality of care for women seeking abortions and . . . protect[ing] the
health and welfare of women seeking abortions.”102 The decision took
issue with the district court’s independent analysis of the plaintiffs’
evidence regarding the lack of purported health benefits, declaring that
“the district court erred by substituting its own judgment [as to the
provisions’ effects] for that of the legislature, albeit . . . in the name of
the undue burden inquiry.”103
96.

See Grossman et al., supra note 9, at 498.

97.

Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 678 (W.D. Tex.
2014).

98.

Id. at 687.

99.

Id.

100. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir.
2015), modified, 790 F.3d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
101. Id. at 576, 594. The Fifth Circuit also overturned the lower court’s facial
invalidation of the challenged provisions on procedural grounds, id. at
580–83, but the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s procedural
rulings in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 136 S. Ct. 2292 at 2304–
09. A more detailed discussion of the procedural aspects of this case falls
outside of the scope of this Note.
102. Id. at 584.
103. Id. at 587 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)).
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The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court erred in its
determination that the remaining clinics would not have the capacity
to meet statewide demand for abortion care if the restrictions were
upheld.104 Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court had
erred in facially invalidating the challenged restrictions because the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that either restriction “imposes an
undue burden on a large fraction of women.”105
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and a 5-3 majority reversed
the Fifth Circuit’s ruling.106 After determining that the challenge was
not precluded on procedural grounds, the Court provided clarification
in regard to the correct application of the standard of review in
substantive due process challenges to abortion regulations. The Court
concluded that the Fifth Circuit’s application of the undue-burden
standard was incorrect, because courts must “consider the burdens a
law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws
confer.”107 The majority rejected outright the implication that a
“district court should not consider the existence or nonexistence of
medical benefits when considering whether a regulation of abortion
constitutes an undue burden.”108 The Court also rejected the appellate
court’s contention that “legislatures, and not courts, must resolve
questions of medical uncertainty.”109
The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, went on to analyze
the restrictions’ medical benefits and the burden that they placed on
Texas women’s right to choose to have an abortion, relying heavily on
scientific evidence, public health studies, and demographic data.
Ultimately, the Court held that the restrictions constituted undue
burdens after weighing what the court determined to be a “virtual
absence of any health benefit” against the cumulative impact of the
restrictions’ various burdens.110
Finally, the Court disposed of several of Texas’s remaining
arguments, including those regarding H.B. 2’s severability clause and
purportedly contrary Supreme Court precedent.111 Perhaps most

104. Id. at 589–90.
105. Id. at 576, 590.
106. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016).
107. Id. at 2309 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
887–98 (1992)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2310.
110. Id. at 2313.
111. Id. at 2318–20.
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critically, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s application of the largefraction test, which Texas had urged the Court to apply.112

II. Analyzing the Purported and Actual Benefits of
Abortion Restrictions after Whole Woman’s Health
Rather than deferring to Texas’s claims regarding the need to
safeguard women’s health by imposing the challenged regulations on
abortion providers, the Whole Woman’s Health majority independently
analyzed the benefits of the H.B. 2 provisions, referring to scientific
evidence, public health data, and medical expert testimony. This
approach reversed a trend in abortion jurisprudence of deference to
woman-protective arguments, which began in Casey.
A. Recognizing Abortion as a Safe Medical Procedure

In assessing the supposed health benefits of the challenged H.B. 2
provisions, the Court cited studies and data showing that abortion has
extremely low serious complication and mortality rates, both in Texas
and across the country, and it determined that “there was no significant
health-related problem that the [restrictions] helped to cure.”113 The
Court’s recognition of evidence demonstrating that abortion is a
remarkably safe medical procedure interrupts the strategic narrative
advanced by anti-abortion advocates that characterizes “pregnant
women and fetuses alike as victims of a dangerous and greedy abortion
industry” and reframes abortion restrictions as necessary to protect
women from these dangers.114 Without a legitimate health-related
problem to address, the benefits of woman-protective abortion
restrictions are called into serious question.
Despite the Court’s recognition that abortion is a safe medical
procedure, government defendants are likely to continue arguing that
challenged regulations are necessary to protect women’s health. Going
forward, however, defendants will need to provide evidence of specific
health-related benefits to justify woman-protective abortion
restrictions, rather than rely on general claims regarding the dangers
associated with abortion.115 After all, future plaintiffs challenging
woman-protective restrictions can easily counter such general claims by
112. Id. at 2320. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the Whole
Woman’s Health decision, see infra Section IV.B.
113. Id. at 2311, 2315.
114. Franklin, supra note 85 (manuscript at 6).
115. See, e.g., Burns v. Cline, 2016 OK 121, 387 P.3d 348 (Okla. 2016). In
Burns v. Cline, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected the State’s
contention that the challenged admitting privileges requirement
“advance[d] and protect[ed] women’s health,” citing the “national
scientific evidence presented in Hellerstedt [that] disputed such claims.”
Id. ¶ 18, 387 P.3d at 353.

1025

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019
Faute de Mieux

demonstrating that the relevant state (or federal) abortion morbidity
and complication rates are on par with the corresponding rates in
Texas.
Following Whole Woman’s Health, some courts have been more
willing than others to entertain defendants’ claims regarding health
risks. When abortion providers in Missouri brought a challenge to the
state’s similar ASC and admitting-privileges requirements, the state
argued that those regulations protect against the “physical risks of
abortion procedures.”116 In response to evidence showing low abortionrelated complication rates presented by the plaintiffs, Missouri claimed
that the plaintiffs—as well as abortion clinics across the country—
under-report abortion-related complications.117 The U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Missouri granted the plaintiffs’ request for
a preliminary injunction, declining to consider the “new material, copies
of studies and expert opinions” presented by the state as evidence of
the “dangerousness of abortions.”118 The court noted that it would be
“impermissible judicial practice” to “reappraise the abortion safety
issue, after the very extensive advocacy on both sides in Hellerstedt.”119
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit took issue with the lower court’s
refusal to consider the health- and safety-related evidence presented by
Missouri.120 The court claimed that the Whole Woman’s Health
majority’s benefits analysis relied on findings regarding the safety of
abortion in Texas specifically, and raised the possibility that a “unique
problem” exists in Missouri that “may require a different response than
what was needed in Texas.”121 The Eighth Circuit vacated and
remanded the decision granting the preliminary injunction, directing
the district court to consider the evidence of the admitting-privilege
requirement’s purported health-related benefits and weigh those
116. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 17–18, Comprehensive Health of Planned
Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, 903 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2018) (No.
17-1996).
117. See The State Defendants’ Post-Hearing Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4–7,
Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Williams,
263 F. Supp. 3d 729 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv-04313). Texas raised
similar arguments in Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey. 46 F. Supp. 3d
673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2014). The district court gave “appropriate weight
to the experts' conflicting testimony,” and ultimately “conclude[d] that
concerns over incomplete complication reporting and underestimated
complication rates are largely unfounded and are without a reliable basis.”
Id.
118. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Williams,
263 F. Supp. 3d 729, 733 (W.D. Mo. 2017).
119. Id.
120. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley,
903 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2018).
121. Id. at 758–59.
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benefits against the evidence of the requirement’s burden.122 Although
the district court subsequently declined to grant another preliminary
injunction against the admitting privileges requirement, its decision
focused on the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence of burden, and the
court acknowledged that Missouri’s claims about the requirement’s
woman-protective benefits were “dubious.”123 Even if the district court
had determined that there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that
abortion is less safe in Missouri than it is in Texas, Whole Woman’s
Health would have required the court to determine whether the
challenged abortion restriction actually addressed the purported safety
issues in Missouri.124
B. Critically Analyzing Evidence of Purported Benefits in the AbortionSpecific Context

After concluding that abortion was an incredibly safe procedure
prior to the enactment of the challenged provisions, the Whole
Woman's Health Court went on to analyze whether the challenged
regulations actually provided any health benefit when imposed on
abortion providers. The majority determined that the purported
benefits of the ASC and admitting-privileges requirements were
irrelevant in the abortion context.
The Court first considered whether the admitting-privilege
requirement would actually improve health outcomes for abortion
patients. The Court cited evidence demonstrating that on the rare
occasions that abortion patients “suffer complications requiring
hospitalization, most of these complications occur in the days after the
abortion,” and the patients “will likely seek medical attention at the
hospital nearest [their] home[s].”125 Thus, requiring abortion providers
to obtain admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the
clinic would not improve health outcomes for abortion patients who
experience complications.126 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the
requirement “d[id] not serve any relevant credentialing function” after
finding that providers were being denied admitting privileges for
reasons unrelated to their competency, and the safety of abortion would

122. Id. at 758. To some extent, the evidentiary issues that arise in this case
may result from the Whole Woman’s Health Court’s failure to explain
who bears the burden of proof for each prong of the undue burden
balancing test. A thorough explanation of evidentiary burdens in Whole
Woman’s Health and future challenges of abortion restrictions falls outside
of the scope of this Note.
123. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Williams,
No. 2:16-cv-04313-BCW at 12 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2019).
124. See discussion infra Section II.B.
125. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311 (2016).
126. See id. at 2310–11.
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make it difficult for providers to meet the required number of hospital
admissions.127
Next, the Court assessed the benefits of requiring abortion clinics
to comply with the ASC requirements. The Court determined that the
surgical-center requirements designed to “reduce infection where
doctors conduct procedures that penetrate the skin” were inapplicable
to abortion facilities because medication abortion involves the
administration of pills taken orally and surgical abortion is “performed
through the natural opening of the birth canal, which is itself not
sterile.”128 Because abortion clinics “do not use general anesthesia or
deep sedation,” the Court found the provisions aimed at “safeguard[ing]
heavily sedated patients (unable to help themselves) during fire
emergencies” completely unnecessary as well.129
The majority also rejected the dissent’s contention that H.B. 2
might force the closure of unsafe clinics like the facility run by Kermit
Gosnell in Pennsylvania.130 The majority pointed out that “Gosnell’s
deplorable crimes could escape detection only because his facility went
uninspected for more than 15 years,” and “[p]re-existing Texas law
already contained numerous detailed regulations covering abortion
facilities, including a requirement that facilities be inspected at least
annually.”131 In other words, “[d]etermined wrongdoers, already
ignoring existing statutes and safety measures,” are unlikely to be
deterred by the addition of more statutes and safety measures.132
The Court’s analysis has several important implications for future
challenges to abortion restrictions—particularly for TRAP laws that
impose on abortion clinics the types of regulations typically reserved
for facilities where much riskier procedures are performed. First,
evidence that a regulation improves health outcomes in other medical
contexts can be countered with evidence demonstrating why the
regulations would not be beneficial when applied to abortion
127. Id. at 2312–13.
128. Id. at 2315–16.
129. Id. at 2316.
130. Id. at 2313. The Court explained that:
Gosnell, a physician in Pennsylvania, was convicted of first-degree
murder and manslaughter. He staffed his facility with unlicensed
and indifferent workers, and then let them practice medicine
unsupervised and had [d]irty facilities; unsanitary instruments; an
absence of functioning monitoring and resuscitation equipment;
the use of cheap, but dangerous, drugs; illegal procedures; and
inadequate emergency access for when things inevitably went
wrong.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
131. Id. at 2314.
132. Id. at 2313–14.
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specifically. Second, even if the government presents reliable evidence
of an existing problem or health risk specific to abortion, the majority
opinion in Whole Woman’s Health calls for courts to analyze the fit
between the problem and the challenged restriction.
C. The Role of Junk Science and Substantial Uncertainty After Whole
Woman’s Health

Many abortion restrictions—including ASC and admittingprivileges requirements like those struck down in Whole Woman’s
Health—are premised on scientifically unfounded assertions.133 States
have passed counseling requirements that force providers to tell patients
that abortion can cause mental health problems, infertility, and breast
cancer, despite large bodies of evidence refuting all of these claims.134
Legislative attempts to either ban abortion before viability or require
physicians to perform additional risky and unnecessary procedures
before terminating a pregnancy often rely on disproven “pseudoscience”
regarding the point during a pregnancy when a fetus becomes capable
of feeling pain.135 Although numerous peer-reviewed studies have
contradicted abortion opponents’ claims regarding the negative
psychological impact of abortion, states continue to pass laws that
purport to protect women from post-abortion trauma.136 The list goes
on and on.
Despite numerous commentators declaring that Whole Woman’s
Health marked the end of abortion restrictions justified by “junk
science,” this conclusion is likely overstated. The Court restored
heightened scrutiny to the undue-burden standard by calling for the
independent judicial evaluation of evidence to determine whether
abortion regulations yield their purported benefits. However, the Court
did not change the applicable rules of evidence, and the majority
opinion’s deference to the district court’s findings of fact leaves trial
courts with a great deal of latitude when evaluating and weighing the
evidence of abortion restrictions’ benefits and burdens in the future.137
Judges typically receive empirical evidence through expert
testimony and amicus curiae briefs.138 There are no “formal tests”
dictating what material can or cannot be included in amicus curiae
133. Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, Flouting the Facts: State Abortion
Restrictions Flying in the Face of Science, 20 Guttmacher Pol’y Rev.
53, 53–54 (2017).
134. Id. at 56.
135. Id. at 56–57.
136. See Susan A. Cohen, Still True: Abortion Does Not Increase Women’s
Risk of Mental Health Problems, 16 Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 13, 14–16
(2013).
137. See Zeigler, supra note 19, at 114.
138. Erickson & Simon, supra note 26, at 19.
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briefs; all kinds of “extralegal” materials may be entered into the
record.139 As Justice Breyer explained in his majority opinion, the
admissibility of expert testimony is determined under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.140
While Daubert calls for trial court judges to analyze the reliability of
expert evidence, judges’ effectiveness in determining reliability and
their ability to truly understand and assess empirical research is a
matter of debate.141 Critics point out that “judges have little empirical
training”142 and “courts are ill equipped to assess social science research
critically.”143
The Supreme Court’s use of empirical evidence has not escaped
criticism, particularly when deciding constitutional questions.144 Some
commentators assert that the Court has ignored or distorted valid
empirical evidence that seemingly contradicts a desired conclusion in
specific cases.145 This critique is highly relevant to the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence.
139. Id. at 32.
140. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2317 (2016) (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must
ensure that any and all [expert] evidence admitted is not only relevant,
but reliable”)); see also Erickson & Simon, supra note 26, at 23–31.
141. See, e.g., Ben K. Grunwald, Comment, Suboptimal Social Science and
Judicial Precedent, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1409, 1412–13, 1439–40 (2013).
142. Id. at 1439.
143. Id. at 1413.
144. See, e.g., Erickson & Simon, supra note 26; Wallace D. Loh, Social
Research in the Judicial Process (1984); Paul S. Appelbaum, The
Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 Am. J.L.
& Med. 335 (1987); Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman & Geoffrey R. Stone,
Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1001 (2015);
David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 541 (1991); Grunwald, supra note 141; Dean M. Hashimoto, Science
as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 Or. L. Rev. 111 (1997); John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15
Law & Human Behav. 571, 572 (1991) (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908)); Niels Petersen, Avoiding the Common-Wisdom Fallacy:
The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional Adjudication, 11 Int’l J.
Const. L. 294 (2013); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role
of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 655 (1988); Amy Rublin, The Role of Social Science in Judicial
Decision Making: How Gay Rights Advocates Can Learn from Integration
and Capital Punishment Case Law, 19 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 179
(2011).
145. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 144, at 505. Faigman, however, argues that
the Court is still restrained to an extent by available empirical evidence
because “persistent misapplication of empirical data undermines the
Court’s legitimacy.” Id. at 604.
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In both Casey and Gonzales, the Court upheld abortion restrictions
after finding that they advanced the state’s interest in protecting
women’s psychological health, ignoring substantial bodies of reliable
evidence to the contrary.146 The plurality opinion in Casey drew
conclusions about abortion’s psychological impact on women without
citing supporting evidence from either side.147 The majority in Gonzales
admitted that its assumption was unsupported by empirical evidence,
citing instead to an amicus brief containing anecdotal stories from
individual women who regretted having an abortion.148 Neither opinion
acknowledged that the Court had been presented with peer-reviewed
empirical studies that demonstrated a lack of correlation between
abortion and negative psychological outcomes.149
Anti-abortion activists’ strategic efforts to manufacture scientific
uncertainty likely played a role in the outcomes of those cases.150
Beginning in the 1980s, abortion opponents began funding research and
gathering “scientific” evidence for the purpose of introducing
“uncertainty” in relation to the safety of abortion and established
medical practices, the impact on women’s psychological and physical
health, and fetal pain.151 Although the purpose of gathering this
evidence was to justify the need for various abortion restrictions, the
goal was not to “establish convincing proof,” but “to show a lack of
certainty.”152 The anti-abortion strategists believed that if they could
convince courts that abortion might harm women or cause fetal pain,
judges would uphold regulations purportedly addressing these potential
harms, regardless of evidence to the contrary.153 Abortion opponents
supplemented their pseudoscience with anecdotal testimonials,
“contend[ing] that even if the risks of abortion could not be conclusively
proven, women’s personal experiences made abortion restrictions a
146. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
they once created and sustained.”); see also Ahmed, supra note 37, at 98
(discussing the Court’s rejection of evidence that abortion does not have
a detrimental psychological impact on women in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
147. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; see also supra notes 50–53 and accompanying
text.
148. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano et al., as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380)); see
also supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
149. Ahmed, supra note 37, at 97–98, 107–08.
150. Zeigler, supra note 19, at 113–14.
151. Id. at 79, 90. See also supra note 37.
152. Id. at 93–94.
153. Id.
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necessary precaution.”154 As already discussed, these efforts were
successful in both Casey and Gonzales.155 Gonzales, in particular,
represented a major victory for advocates of this strategy, as some lower
courts, including the Fifth Circuit, read Gonzales as requiring judicial
deference to legislative judgment when scientific or medical uncertainty
underlies an abortion regulation.156 The Whole Woman’s Health
majority, however, unequivocally rejected this interpretation of
Gonzales, and reaffirmed courts’ “independent constitutional duty to
review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”157
The future impact of junk science and scientific uncertainty on
abortion jurisprudence after Whole Woman’s Health is still not entirely
clear. While the Whole Woman’s Health majority instructed lower
courts “not [to] place dispositive weight” on legislative findings of
fact,158 pseudoscientific and anecdotal evidence may still be presented
in judicial proceedings. Trial courts continue to bear the responsibility
of assessing the reliability of expert evidence and determining how much
weight to give contradictory evidence. Justice Breyer’s opinion did not
overtly disclaim the Gonzales majority’s reliance on scientific
uncertainty and anecdotal evidence, and unsympathetic lower courts
may continue to rely on evidence establishing the mere possibility of a
threat to women’s health or fetal-life interests, even when presented
with contradictory empirical evidence.159 However, the majority’s
articulation of the undue-burden standard in Whole Woman’s Health
should, in theory, provide plaintiffs with two potential strategies for
confronting scientific uncertainty in future challenges. Plaintiffs may
argue that concrete evidence of an abortion regulation’s burdens should
154. Id. at 95.
155. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text. Scientific or medical
uncertainty has also played a role in the Court’s analyses of the burdens
imposed by challenged regulations. In finding that the challenged D&X
ban did not constitute an undue burden, the Gonzales majority relied on
“medical uncertainty” over whether banning the D&X procedure
presented significant health risks for women. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 164 (2007); see also supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir.
2015) (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163–64, 166), modified, 790 F.3d 598,
599 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
157. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016)
(quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165) (emphasis omitted).
158. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165).
159. Ziegler, supra note 19, at 109, 114. Mary Zeigler argues that if the “Whole
Woman’s Health [opinion is taken] at face value, there is little stopping
lower courts from upholding abortion restrictions whenever they can make
factual findings that are not clearly erroneous and that support the
conclusion that the balance of benefits and burdens supports the
restriction.” Id. at 114.
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outweigh evidence of an “uncertain” benefit. Moreover, plaintiffs should
call on courts to scrutinize the “fit” between the challenged abortion
restriction and the potential problem it purports to address.

III. Analyzing the Burdens Imposed by Abortion
Restrictions after Whole Woman’s Health
While the Court’s recognition in Whole Woman’s Health of the
overall safety of abortion as a medical procedure should make it more
difficult for states to justify abortion restrictions by claiming they
protect women’s health, the Court’s undue-burden analysis did not stop
after finding that the state had failed to provide any evidence of a
health benefit. Rather, the Court engaged in a fact-specific analysis of
the burdens imposed by the admitting-privileges and ASC
requirements, relying heavily on demographic data and public health
evidence developed by researchers who studied the impact of H.B. 2
after it went into effect.
A. Important Take-Aways from the Majority’s Burden Analysis

The Whole Woman’s Health majority’s pragmatic analysis of the
burdens imposed by the ASC and admitting privileges requirements
provided critical recognition of the real-world impact that TRAP laws
have on abortion access. After finding sufficient evidence demonstrating
that the challenged requirements caused widespread clinic closures, the
Whole Woman’s Health majority highlighted a number of ways that
clinic closures impacted abortion access in Texas. These burdens
included increases in travel distance to the nearest abortion clinic,
increases in wait times and crowding, and decreases in individualized
patient care.160 The majority rejected theoretical speculation that
clinics could expand their capacity enough to meet the statewide need
for abortion services, noting the difficulty of compliance with the
challenged requirements.161 Ultimately, the majority determined that
the cumulative impact of the challenged provisions’ various burdens
amounted to a substantial obstacle to abortion access that outweighed
the provisions’ nonexistent medical benefits.162
1. Capacity Analysis

A significant portion of the majority’s burden analyses focused on
the remaining clinics’ ability (or lack thereof) to sufficiently increase
their capacity in the wake of the abrupt wave of clinic closures. The
majority cited evidence gathered after the admitting privileges
requirement went into effect, closing half of Texas’s abortion clinics.
160. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2313, 2318
(2016).
161. See discussion infra Section III.A.3.
162. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
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These closures resulted in “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and
increased crowding,” thus demonstrating that the remaining clinics
“were not able to accommodate increased demand.”163 The majority
opinion also recited expert calculations of the total number of abortions
performed annually in Texas, the average number of abortions that
each clinic provides, and the average increase in the number of
abortions that the remaining clinics would have to perform in order to
meet the annual demand for abortion care.164 The Court found a
sufficient evidential basis for inferring that the seven or eight clinics
that would remain open if the ASC requirement went into effect would
not be capable of meeting the statewide demand for abortion services.165
The majority opinion then went on to consider the cumulative impact
of the various capacity-related burdens (including appointmentscheduling delays and decreased individualized patient attention)
together with the burdens caused by the dramatic increases in travel
distance to the nearest abortion clinic.166
The capacity analysis articulated in Whole Woman’s Health has a
wide range of potential applications. It provides a useful framework for
analyzing the burdens caused by clinic closures in a smaller state, where
increases in travel distance may not be nearly as drastic as they were
in Texas.167 The capacity analysis can also be applied to abortion
regulations that decrease the number of individual providers able to
perform abortions in a state, even if no clinics are forced to close.168
Finally, it may provide a helpful way to articulate the burdens caused
by regulations that require providers to perform additional or more
time-consuming procedures, as such requirements would likely decrease
the number of abortions that providers are able to perform.169

163. Id. at 2313, 2318.
164. See id. at 2301–02, 2316–18.
165. See id. at 2316–18.
166. Id. at 2313, 2318.
167. However, future government defendants will likely try to distinguish
Whole Woman’s Health by pointing to Texas’s sudden and dramatic
decrease of abortion providers that would have required the remaining
clinics to perform five times as many abortions. For further discussion,
see infra Section III.B.2.
168. Examples of laws that may have this effect include admitting privilege
requirements, licensing requirements, and physician-only requirements.
See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text; see also An Overview of
Abortion Laws, Guttmacher Inst. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.
guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma.
cc/LV42-LT8V].
169. Such laws may include informed-consent laws that require physicians to
provide the information in person, ultrasound requirements, and method
bans that require physicians to induce fetal demise before performing a
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2. Cumulative-Burden Analysis

The majority’s consideration of the cumulative impact of multiple
burdens seemingly opens the door for greater recognition of the realworld consequences of abortion restrictions in future challenges. Prior
to Whole Woman’s Health, the Court had dismissed concerns regarding
the disparate impact of abortion regulations that merely inconvenienced
some but were incredibly restrictive to others. The prime example of
this is the Court’s decision to uphold the twenty-four-hour waiting
period requirement in Casey.170 The district court had found that the
twenty-four-hour waiting period, which required two visits to an
abortion provider, would often delay abortions for much more than a
day, increase travel distances, and increase costs.171 As a result, the
requirement disproportionately burdened women who had limited
financial resources, lived far away from the nearest clinic, or “ha[d]
difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or
others.”172 The Casey plurality was “troubl[ed] in some respects” by
these findings, but ultimately determined that the evidence in the
record did not demonstrate that these increased costs and delays
amounted to substantial obstacles for any population.173
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court was once again confronted
with lower court findings regarding the burdens imposed by increased
travel distances and the “particularly high barrier [they created] for
poor, rural, or disadvantaged women.”174 Justice Breyer’s majority

dilation and evacuation abortion. See supra notes 30–33, 57–69 and
accompanying text; see also Guttmacher, supra note 168.
170. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992).
171. Id. at 885–86 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp.
1323, 1351–52 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).
172. Id. at 886 (citing Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1352).
173. Id.
174. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 (2016)
(quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D.
Tex. 2014)). The district court also highlighted the combined impact of
increased travel distances together with “practical concerns,” such as
“lack of availability of child care, unreliability of transportation,
unavailability of appointments at abortion facilities, unavailability of time
off from work, immigration status and inability to pass border
checkpoints, poverty level, the time and expense involved in traveling long
distances, and other, inarticulable psychological obstacles.” Whole
Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2014). The
court concluded that the cumulative impact of these factors together with
increased travel distances amounted to “a de facto barrier to obtaining an
abortion for a large number of Texas women of reproductive age
who might choose to seek a legal abortion.” Id. Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion in Whole Woman’s Health noted the combined impact of increases
in travel distance “taken together with other[] [burdens] that the closings
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opinion highlighted the significant increases in the necessary travel
distance to reach an abortion provider in Texas, caused by the clinic
closures. The Court cited evidence in the record showing that:
[The] number of women of reproductive age living in a
county . . . more than 150 miles from a provider increased from
approximately 86,000 to 400,000 . . . and the number of women
living in a county more than 200 miles from a provider [increased]
from approximately 10,000 to 290,000.175

The Court noted that, under Casey, “increased driving distances do not
always constitute an ‘undue burden,’” and ultimately considered the
cumulative impact of the increased travel distances together with all of
the other burdens caused by the clinic closings.176 The majority’s
wording seems to leave open the possibility that increased driving
distances could constitute an undue burden when considered as the sole
obstacle created by a challenged restriction. The opinion, however, does
not clarify whether the increased driving distances that the Court
details in its analysis are enough to independently support a finding of
undue burden.
The majority’s consideration of increased travel distances as part
of its cumulative-burden analysis certainly represented progress
towards a greater recognition that requiring women to travel long
distances for abortion care is a substantial burden in and of itself. The
Court, however, missed an opportunity to recognize the impact of
increased travel distance and cost on the right to abortion. The Court
was clear in Casey that its determination was “based on the
insufficiency of the record before it,”177 leaving open the possibility of a
different holding in the future. Numerous studies performed after Casey
was decided have demonstrated that increased distance to the nearest
abortion clinic does, in fact, impede women’s ability to obtain an
abortion. The record in Whole Woman’s Health contained evidence
showing that when distance to the nearest abortion clinic increases,
women’s access decreases.178 However, these findings received no
mention by the Court.
brought about,” 136 S. Ct. at 2313, but did not reference the district
court’s specific findings regarding these practical concerns.
175. Id. at 2313 (quoting Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681) (internal quotes
omitted).
176. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–87) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ).
177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
178. See, e.g., Joint Appendix Volume II, Direct Testimony of Daniel
Grossman, M.D. at 248–49, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No.
15-274) (citing Silvie Colman & Ted Joyce, Regulating Abortion: Impact
on Patients and Providers in Texas, 30 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt.
775 (2011); Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Denial of Abortion Because of
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The majority opinion did, however, make it clear that burdens short
of preventing women from obtaining an abortion can constitute
“substantial obstacles” for the purposes of the undue-burden test. While
the majority’s determination that the remaining clinics would not have
the capacity to meet the statewide need for abortion services certainly
implies that some Texas women would be unable to obtain a desired
abortion, the Court’s analysis did not focus on the women who would
be forced to forego the procedure entirely. Rather, the Court
highlighted the numerous negative impacts on individuals attempting
to obtain an abortion, such as increased driving distances, longer wait
times, overcrowded facilities, and declines in quality of care and
individualized attention. The Court held that these burdens taken
together outweighed the lack of medical benefits and thus constituted
an undue burden.179 This cumulative analysis opened the door for other
burdens, previously dismissed as not sufficiently substantial, to amount
to constitutional violations when considered together.
3. Theoretical Possibilities Insufficient to Counter Evidence of Burden

In analyzing the burden imposed by the challenged abortion
restrictions, the majority rejected arguments made by both the dissent
and Texas that suggested abortion clinics and providers could adapt to
the increased need for their services if the challenged restrictions forced
the majority of clinics to close. In his dissent, Justice Alito argued that
the remaining clinics may have been able to “hire more physicians who
perform abortions, utilize their facilities more intensively or efficiently,
or shift the mix of services provided” in order to increase their
capacity.180 Texas also argued that the few remaining clinics could
“expand sufficiently” to serve the “60,000 to 72,000” women seeking
Provider Gestational Age Limits in the United States, 104 Am. J. Pub.
Health 1687 (2014)); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Public
Health Association in Support of Petitioners at 20 n.43, Whole Woman’s
Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274) (citing Colman & Joyce, supra, at
777–79; Stanley K. Henshaw, Factors Hindering Access to Abortion
Services, 27 Family Planning Perspectives 54, 54 (1995)). The
evidence Dr. Grossman discussed included a study of the impact of a
Texas “law limiting the performance of abortions at sixteen weeks or later
to ASCs and hospitals” that was enacted in 2003, which found that:
[W]hen the law took effect, there was an immediate and dramatic
reduction in both the number of licensed facilities in Texas able
to provide abortion services at 16 weeks and later and in the
number of abortions performed in Texas at those gestational ages.
Two years later, the abortion rate for those gestational ages
remained 50% below what it was prior to the law’s enactment.
Direct Testimony of Daniel Grossman, M.D., supra (citing Colman &
Joyce, supra).
179. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
180. Id. at 2347 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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abortions each year, and pointed to a new clinic that had opened which
“serves 9,000 women annually.”181
The majority was unconvinced by these theoretical scenarios. The
majority found the contention that clinics could hire additional
physicians “not [] quite as simple as the dissent suggest[ed],” considering
that so many clinics were forced to close because they did not have a
physician with admitting privileges.182 As for the argument that the
remaining clinics could sufficiently expand to meet the increased need
for services, the Court found that the plaintiffs “had satisfied their
burden, [so] the obligation was on Texas, if it could, to present evidence
rebutting that issue.”183 Texas did not present such evidence. While
noting that the opening of the new clinic was outside the record, the
Court found that the $26 million cost of constructing the new clinic was
evidence “that requiring seven or eight clinics to serve five times their
usual number of patients does indeed represent an undue burden on
abortion access.”184 Finally, the Court highlighted the district court’s
findings regarding the amount that it would cost existing abortion
clinics to comply with the ASC requirements. The cost ranged from $1
million for a clinic that already had adequate space, to $3 million for a
clinic that would need to purchase additional land.185 The majority
determined that these costs made it unlikely that more ASC-compliant
clinics would “fill the gap” created by clinic closures.186
The majority’s refusal to entertain unsubstantiated speculation
that clinics may be able to adapt to unnecessary regulations so as to
minimize the burdens these regulations place on abortion access has
important implications for both pre- and post-enforcement challenges.
If the Court had accepted these speculative arguments, pre-enforcement
challenges would become incredibly difficult for plaintiffs to win, and
more individuals would have their rights unduly burdened before
unconstitutional abortion restrictions could be enjoined.187 Postenforcement challenges would also become more difficult if plaintiffs
were forced to demonstrate that they had taken every conceivable
action in an attempt to comply with the challenged abortion restriction,
regardless of how futile, difficult, expensive, or self-destructive.
181. Id. at 2317 (majority opinion).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2317–18.
185. Id. at 2318.
186. Id.
187. Individuals forced to forgo or delay a desired abortion (as a result of an
abortion restriction) experience irreversible harm. In addition, clinics that
are forced to close because of abortion restrictions are unlikely to reopen
their doors when the restrictions are struck down. See infra notes 203–
206 and accompanying text.
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The Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion in June Medical Services v.
Gee188 illustrates the difficulties created for plaintiffs when courts focus
on theoretical possibilities rather than the circumstances on the ground.
The district court struck down Louisiana’s admitting-privileges
requirement—which, like the provision struck down in Whole Woman’s
Health, required abortion providers to hold admitting privileges at a
hospital within thirty miles—after finding that the requirement placed
an undue burden on the right to abortion.189 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court’s judgment after holding that the district court had
plainly erred in finding that the majority of abortion providers in
Louisiana were unable to obtain admitting privileges despite their goodfaith efforts.190 The majority pointed out all of the possible actions that
it believed the providers could and should have taken in an effort to
obtain privileges, and it determined that because the providers did not
take all of those actions, they had not put forth a good-faith effort to
comply with the regulation.191 Based on this finding, the majority held
that the plaintiffs had “failed to establish a causal connection between
the regulation and its burden—namely, doctors’ inability to obtain
admitting privileges.”192 The dissenting judge admonished the majority
for failing to give appropriate deference to the district court’s findings
and for failing to follow Whole Woman’s Health.193 One example of the
majority’s flawed analyses is its conclusion that one of the abortion
providers had not put forth a good-faith effort because he made no
attempt to obtain privileges from two hospitals located within thirty
miles of the clinic where he worked, and these hospitals continued to
be “open options” for the provider.194 The dissent noted evidence in the
record that one of the two hospitals “requires applicants to be able to
admit fifty patients annually (something [the provider] c[ould not] do),”
as well as evidence that a different provider applied for privileges at
both hospitals but “was unable to obtain privileges from either.”195 The
provider had applied at three other hospitals but was unable to obtain

188. 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
189. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 88–89 (M.D. La.
2017), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th
Cir. 2018).
190. June Med. Servs., 905 F.3d at 807, 810, 815. The Supreme Court stayed
the Fifth Circuit’s mandate pending the outcome of the plaintiffs’ petition
for a writ of certiorari. June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663
(2019).
191. June Med. Servs., 905 F.3d at 808–10.
192. Id. at 807.
193. Id. at 816 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 808 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 829 n.40 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting).
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privileges that satisfied the regulatory requirements.196 Clearly, the
majority’s conclusion relies on possibilities that are entirely improbable
based on facts in the record and is inconsistent with the Court’s
pragmatic burden analysis in Whole Woman’s Health.197 Furthermore,
the majority opinion would seemingly require abortion providers to
submit futile applications for privileges before they can legally establish
the burden imposed by admitting-privileges requirements, even if they
do not meet the explicit eligibility requirements set by the hospital.
Some providers may be unwilling to accrue a record of unsuccessful
privilege applications, which can adversely affect their professional
reputation and their ability to secure hospital privileges in the future.198
B. Applicability of Whole Woman’s Health’s Burden Analysis to Future
Abortion Challenges

While the pragmatic aspects of the majority’s burden analysis seem
to have a wide range of potential applications, the unique factual
circumstances surrounding the challenged abortion restrictions in Texas
and the majority’s narrow focus on the facts of this case may limit the
decision’s utility in cases with less dramatic or otherwise different fact
patterns.
1. The “Benefit” of Hindsight

The Whole Woman’s Health plaintiffs filed suit after the admittingprivileges requirement had already gone into effect and half of the
abortion clinics in Texas had been forced to close.199 Public health
researchers studied the impact of these closures on abortion access and
the provision of abortion services at the remaining clinics.200
Accordingly, the plaintiffs were able to present empirical evidence to
the court measuring the actual burdens imposed by one of the abortion
restrictions they were challenging. Access to this data proved helpful.
In support of its conclusion that the abortion clinics “that were still
196. Id. at 821–22.
197. The dissenting judge clearly articulated the majority’s unreasonable
departure from Whole Woman’s Health:
The majority . . . essentially holds that, because private actors
(the physicians) have not tried hard enough to mitigate the effects
of the act (a conclusion contradicted by the district court’s factual
findings), those effects are not fairly attributable to the act. That
position finds no support in [Whole Woman’s Health].
Id. at 830 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330,
1347 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
199. Daniel Grossman, The Use of Public Health Evidence in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 177 JAMA Internal Med. 155, 155 (2017);
Peterson, supra note 2.
200. Grossman, supra note 199.
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operating after the effective date of the admitting-privileges provision
were not able to accommodate increased demand,” the Whole Woman’s
Health majority cited evidence, gathered by public health researchers,
of “3-week wait times, staff burnout” and severely overcrowded waiting
rooms.201 This evidence also provided much of the foundation for the
Court’s common-sense inference that if the ASC requirement went into
effect, once again causing the number of Texas abortion clinics to
decrease by more than half, the remaining clinics would not be capable
of meeting the need for abortion services in Texas.202
In some circumstances, it can be difficult to predict the full impact
that abortion restrictions will have on abortion access before they take
effect. Researchers who “evaluate[d] the impact of HB 2” found that “it
was critical to document the changes in abortion service delivery after
it went into effect.”203 However, while damage is easier to measure
empirically once it has occurred, it is not always easy to reverse. Two
years after Whole Woman’s Health was decided, only three of the
nineteen clinics forced to close by HB 2’s requirements had reopened.204
Many of the shuttered clinics will never reopen, and those that do will
face an uphill battle. An article published in the Texas Tribune on the
day Whole Woman’s Health was decided described some of the barriers
preventing clinics from reopening:
In the three years since Gov. Rick Perry signed HB 2, many of
the shuttered clinics have sold their buildings or let go of their
leases. Some had to surrender their abortion facility licenses to
the state and will need to apply for a new one. They will also
need to rehire staff and raise funds to acquire new medicine and
equipment.205

As a result of stigma, public relations concerns, and personal
opposition to abortion, clinics have also had a difficult time hiring

201. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (citing
Brief for National Abortion Federation and Abortion Providers as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17–20, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S.
Ct. 2292 (No. 15–264)).
202. See id. at 2317–18.
203. Grossman, supra note 199, at 155.
204. Claire Landsbaum, Here’s Why Texas Abortion Clinics Are Still
Struggling to Reopen, The Cut (June 27, 2017, 4:07 PM), https://www.
thecut.com/2017/06/texas-abortion-clinics-struggling-to-reopen-wholewomans-health-vs-hellerstedt-anniversary.html [https://perma.cc/V8DLXN3Y]; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
205. See Aneri Pattani, Don’t Expect Shuttered Texas Abortion Clinics to
Reopen Soon, Tex. Trib. (June 27, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.
texastribune.org/2016/06/27/dont-expect-shuttered-abortion-clinics-reopensoon/ [https://perma.cc/S8EH-SZPG].
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contractors and finding vendors willing to sell them furniture and
equipment.206
However, while the Court’s capacity analysis did cite evidence
gathered after the admitting-privileges requirement went into effect,
this type of post-enforcement evidence should not be required of all
plaintiffs challenging abortion restrictions. Public health studies
demonstrating the impact of clinic closures in other states, considered
together with case-specific facts, should prove sufficient to infer lack of
capacity. Whole Woman’s Health supports this conclusion, as it
referenced a number of studies and expert opinions in its analysis that
were not specific to Texas.207 Furthermore, when analyzing the burden
that would be imposed by the ASC requirement if it was allowed to go
into effect, the Court’s capacity analysis also relied on “common
sense.”208 The majority found it reasonable to infer that “a physical
facility that satisfies a certain physical demand will not be able to meet
five times that demand without expanding or otherwise incurring
significant costs.”209 This type of analysis should be possible to perform
prior to the enforcement of other restrictions, provided that information
is available about the average number of abortions currently performed
per provider or clinic and about the anticipated number of clinics or
providers that would remain if the restriction went into effect.
2. Dramatic Fact Patterns

As the saying goes, “everything is bigger in Texas.” The public
health data cited by the Court pertaining to travel distance and
demand for abortion care was extremely dramatic, due in part to factors
including: the geographical size of Texas,210 the size of Texas’s
population,211 the geographical distribution of Texas’s remaining clinics,
206. See Landsbaum, supra note 204.
207. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312
(2016) (discussing evidence of common prerequisites to obtaining
admitting privileges at a hospital). The Supreme Court has condoned the
use of “outside” studies in other contexts as well. See, e.g., City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (allowing the city
to rely on studies regarding the effects of adult theaters in other residential
neighborhoods).
208. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2317.
209. Id.
210. Texas is the second largest state in the United States, as measured by
total area. State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates,
U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/statearea.html#n1 [https://perma.cc/25ZE-GMNQ] (last revised Dec. 5,
2012).
211. Texas is the second most populous state in the United States. Idaho Is
Nation’s Fastest-Growing State, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. Census
Bureau (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2017/estimates-idaho.html [https://perma.cc/8WS3-84H9].
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and the geographic distribution of Texas’ poor and rural residents.
Given these hard-to-replicate numbers and circumstances, courts may
uphold similar abortion restrictions by distinguishing the facts of
subsequent challenges that present less shocking data.212
Furthermore, the impact of the challenged H.B. 2 provisions was
both severe and sudden; the admitting-privileges requirement cut the
number of Texas clinics nearly in half over a very short period of time,
and the ASC requirement was expected to do the same.213 In other
states, however, clinic closures have occurred more gradually, as the
result of a number of different restrictions enacted over time.214 The end
result may be the same, but successfully challenging abortion
restrictions that only shut down one or two clinics at a time may prove
to be more difficult than challenging restrictions that cause dramatic
closures. The capacity analysis applied in Whole Woman’s Health seems
to lend itself better to the latter than the former. Evidence presented
by the plaintiffs in Whole Woman’s Health demonstrated that, should
the ASC requirement have been enforced, the remaining clinics would
have been required to perform five times as many abortions to meet the
statewide need.215 The majority determined that, as a matter of common
sense, the remaining facilities were likely incapable of increasing their
services to this degree.216 Courts may decline to make similar inferences
about capacity when remaining clinics have to adjust for a less dramatic
decrease in clinics or providers.
The dramatic fact pattern in Whole Woman’s Health may also limit
the decision’s utility when an abortion restriction creates an ongoing
risk of clinic closures that does not manifest all at once. For example,
admitting-privileges requirements, like the one struck down in Whole
Woman’s Health, place clinics in a precarious position, even when their
providers are initially able to secure compliant privileges. This is
because abortion providers face an ongoing risk of losing their privileges
due to circumstances unrelated to their competence as medical
212. See, e.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 791, 815 (5th Cir.
2018) (holding that Louisiana’s admitting privileges requirement, similar
to the provision struck down in Whole Woman’s Health, did not impose
an undue burden, and contrasting the facts with those in Whole Woman’s
Health, finding the “impact . . . in Louisiana [dramatically less] than in
Texas”).
213. See supra notes 9, 11.
214. See, e.g., Supreme Court Hears Dispute on Abortion Clinic Closure, AP
News (Sept. 12, 2017), https://apnews.com/2fc5de23be2e44e284b4befdd
1a19a7a [https://perma.cc/5S7M-4FCN] (“Restrictions on abortion
clinics in Ohio passed by lawmakers over the last six years have
contributed to the closings of several clinics already. The state has 8
clinics left operating. It had twice that many in 2011.”).
215. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2316.
216. Id. at 2317–18.
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professionals. For example, the purchase of the only local hospital by a
Catholic hospital system217 or pressure from anti-abortion activists
could cause an abortion provider to lose their admitting privileges.218
Finding another hospital willing to grant privileges is often difficult or
impossible.219 Accordingly, this type of requirement may cause more
gradual clinic closures in some states than it did in Texas, creating
potential challenges for plaintiffs trying to establish the burden imposed
by the requirement.
3. Decreasing Access vs. Impeding the Expansion of Access

Whole Woman’s Health analyzed two requirements that “restrict[ed] access to previously available legal [abortion] facilities.”220
Because this case—as well as the majority of abortion jurisprudence—
analyzes burden through the lens of decreases in abortion access from
the status quo, it is hard to tell how courts will measure the burden
imposed by abortion restrictions that impede the expansion of abortion
access.
Telemedicine-abortion bans are a prime example of restrictions that
impede the expansion of abortion access. Technological advances have
led to a massive growth in telemedicine, or “the remote delivery of
healthcare services, such as health assessments or consultations, over
the telecommunications infrastructure.”221 Seeing an opportunity to
217. See Debra Stulberg & Lori Freedman, How Catholic Hospitals Restrict
Reproductive Health Services, Scholar Strategy Network (May 30,
2016), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/how-catholic-hospitals
-restrict-reproductive-health-services [https://perma.cc/BJ2E-BXKV]
(discussing the expansion of Catholic hospitals and systems, and the
directives that, “[a]s a condition of employment or medical privileges,
doctors, nurses, and other clinical personnel are required to follow”)
(emphasis added).
218. See Feminist Newswire, Texas Hospitals Revoke Admitting Privileges to
Abortion Providers, Feminist Majority Found. (Apr. 18, 2014, 11:30
AM), https://feminist.org/blog/index.php/2014/04/18/texas-hospitalsrevoke-admitting-privileges-to-abortion-providers/ [https://perma.cc/J23FWDRY] (reporting that “[t]hree Texas abortion providers this week had
their hospital admitting privileges revoked at nearby hospitals after
abortion opponents threatened the hospitals with negative publicity,”
more than five months after H.B. 2’s admitting privileges requirement
went into effect).
219. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312–13 (describing
“common prerequisites to obtaining admitting privileges,” such as
minimum annual admissions requirements that are impossible for most
abortion providers to meet due to the safety of the procedure).
220. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303 (quoting Whole Woman’s
Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 687–88 (W.D. Tex. 2014)).
221. Margaret Rouse, Telemedicine, SearchHealthIT, http://searchhealthit.
techtarget.com/definition/telemedicine [https://perma.cc/P2G9-3DZR]
(last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
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reach women who do not live near an abortion clinic, abortion providers
in a handful of states have started using telemedicine to provide
medication abortions.222 In response, many states have passed preemptive bans. As of March 2019, “17 states require that the clinician
providing a medication abortion be physically present during the
procedure, thereby prohibiting the use of telemedicine to prescribe
medication for abortion remotely.”223
Although telemedicine-abortion bans purport to protect women’s
health, peer-reviewed studies show that medication abortions are just
as safe when provided through telemedicine as when provided in
person.224 Furthermore, many of the states that have enacted these bans
do not prohibit other forms of telemedicine.225 Based on this evidence,
states should have a difficult time showing that the bans further their
interest in protecting women’s health. The more pressing question is
whether courts will find that these bans impose a burden and, if so,
what kind of evidence is required to support such a finding.226 Would

222. Medication Abortion, Guttmacher Inst., https://www.guttmacher.org/
state-policy/explore/medication-abortion [https://perma.cc/8WRH-G8A7]
(last updated Mar. 1, 2019); Angie Leventis Lourgos, Illinois Clinic
Provides Abortions via Telemedicine, Which Provides Wider Access but
Is Prohibited in 19 States, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 19, 2018, 5:00 A.M.), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/ct-met-telemedicine-abortionillinois-20171220-story.html [https://perma.cc/UR8R-HJFQ] (describing
telemedicine abortion in Illinois); Eric Wicklund, Abortion-byTelemedicine Pilot Launches in 4 States, mHealth Intelligence (Apr.
1, 2016), https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/abortion-by-telemedicinepilot-launches-in-4-states [https://perma.cc/C76U-L3ZN] (discussing
telemedicine abortion in Iowa and a pilot program launched in Hawaii,
Oregon, New York, and Washington).
223. Medication Abortion, supra note 222.
224. Daniel Grossman & Kate Grindlay, Safety of Medical Abortion Provided
Through Telemedicine Compared with in Person, 130 Obstetrics &
Gynecology 778, 778–80 (2017); Abigail R. A. Aiken et al., Self Reported
Outcomes and Adverse Events After Medical Abortion Through Online
Telemedicine: Population Based Study in the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland, 357 BMJ 1 (2017).
225. See, e.g., Latoya Thomas & Gary Capistrant, Am. Telemedicine
Ass’n, State Telemedicine Gaps Analysis: Physician Practice
Standards & Licensure 69–74 (2017).
226. In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Board of Medicine,
865 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 2015), the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the
state’s telemedicine abortion ban “places an undue burden on a woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy as defined by the United States Supreme
Court in its federal constitutional precedents.” Id. at 269. Based on the
record evidence, the court found that the telemedicine ban had “very
limited health benefits” and “would make it more challenging for many
women who wish to exercise their constitutional right to terminate a
pregnancy in Iowa to do so.” Id. at 268. However, the clinic challenging
the ban was one of the first to provide telemedicine abortions in the
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evidence of the number of clinics that would begin providing
telemedicine abortions if the ban is lifted be sufficient? If not, would
the plaintiffs need to provide evidence that women in remote regions of
the state currently face obstacles to accessing abortion care or that the
existing clinics are not capable of meeting the statewide demand? Under
these circumstances, it would be very difficult to measure the number
of women who are unduly burdened by the status quo. Plaintiffs would
likely have to rely on travel-distance data, supplemented with empirical
studies measuring the impact of travel distance on abortion rates.227

IV. Remaining Questions Regarding the Correct
Application of the Undue-Burden Standard
A. Balancing Benefits and Burdens

While the majority made clear that the undue-burden test requires
courts to weigh the actual benefits of an abortion regulation against the
burdens it imposes, the opinion left some remaining questions about
how the test should be applied. After the decision, courts have disagreed
about whether Whole Woman’s Health called for a true balancing test,
or whether the burdens imposed by a challenged abortion regulation
must reach some quantitative or qualitative threshold before the
balancing even becomes necessary. The majority opinion was not
entirely clear regarding how the weighing of benefits and burdens
should be reconciled with Casey’s heavy reliance on the ambiguous
phrase “substantial obstacle” in an attempt to clarify the meaning of
“undue burden.”228 Some courts have interpreted the Whole Woman’s
Health opinion to mean that the burdens imposed by an abortion
regulation amount to a substantial obstacle, and are thus undue, if they
outweigh the benefits of the regulation.229 Others, however, continue to
read the test as requiring a finding that the burden has reached the
level of a substantial obstacle, independent of the outcome of any
balancing.
United States, and clinics across Iowa were already providing this service
when the state legislature instituted the ban. See Lourgos, supra note 222.
227. See, e.g., Jason Lindo et al., How Far is Too Far?: New Evidence on
Abortion Clinic Closures, Access, and Abortions, J. Human Resources
(2019).
228. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(explaining that “[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus”) (emphasis added).
229. Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 264 F. Supp. 3d 813, 821 (W.D. Tex.
2017) (“Where a law’s burdens exceed its benefits, those burdens are, by
definition, undue, and the obstacles they embody are, by definition,
substantial.”).
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A circuit split on this issue is forming along familiar lines. The
Seventh Circuit applied a true balancing test before Whole Woman’s
Health was decided and has stayed true to this interpretation in more
recent decisions. Under this interpretation, even minor burdens can
justify the invalidation of certain abortion restrictions: “[t]he more
feeble the state’s asserted interest, ‘the likelier the burden, even if slight,
to be “undue” in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous.’”230 In
direct contrast, the Fifth Circuit opined in Gee that the standard
articulated in Whole Woman’s Health is not “a ‘pure’ balancing test
under which any burden, no matter how slight, invalidates the law.”231
The majority went on to explain that a regulation can only be
unconstitutional if its burdens amount to a substantial obstacle,
regardless of how minimal its benefits are.232 This articulation is
conspicuously reminiscent of the Fifth Circuit’s prior articulation of the
undue burden test, which the Supreme Court summarily rejected in
Whole Woman’s Health.233 The dissenting judge on the Fifth Circuit
panel criticized the majority for not heeding the Court’s recent
admonitions, “failing to meaningfully balance the burdens and
benefits . . . and leav[ing] the undue burden test devoid of meaning.”234
Requiring the burden to reach the ambiguous threshold
requirement of constituting a “substantial obstacle” before weighing it
against the benefits would seemingly provide even lesser protections to
the constitutional right than the Fifth Circuit’s formulation of the test
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole. After all, under the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation, once the burden reached the point of being a substantial
obstacle to abortion access, the burden became undue and the law
unconstitutional.235 Considering that the Supreme Court adamantly
rejected this interpretation of the test in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt and admonished the Fifth Circuit for not weighing the

230. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of
Health, 896 F.3d 809, 828 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013)).
231. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 803 (5th Cir. 2018).
232. Id. (claiming that “even regulations with a minimal benefit are
unconstitutional only where they present a substantial obstacle to
abortion”).
233. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98
(1992)).
234. June Med. Servs., 905 F.3d at 831 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
235. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 572 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016).
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benefits and burdens,236 it would make little sense to read a threshold
requirement into the Court’s articulation of the balancing test.
B. Large-Fraction Test

Although the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s facial
invalidation of the ASC requirement after finding that the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated that the requirement unduly burdened a large
fraction of women,237 the Whole Woman’s Health majority waited until
the end of the opinion to address this issue. The majority denounced
Texas’s articulation of the “denominator” as “Texan women ‘of
reproductive age,’” explaining that “the relevant denominator is ‘those
[women] for whom [the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant
restriction.’”238 The opinion’s discussion of the large-fraction test began
and ended with this brief rebuke; the majority made no attempt to plug
any numbers into the equation to justify facially invalidating the Texas
abortion requirements. Nor did the Court defer to any explicit
numerical calculations made by the district court, as the district court
engaged in no such analysis. Indeed, it seemed as if the majority
rejected the need for confusing and ambiguous numerical calculations
entirely when it held that the challenged abortion restrictions were
facially unconstitutional without engaging in any such analysis, thus
putting this confusing test to rest.
Although even the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health interpreted
the majority opinion as rendering the large-fraction test obsolete,239 a
number of lower courts have taken a very different message from the
decision. Some courts have justified their continuing application of the
large-fraction test by citing the Court’s “limited discussion” of the
matter in Whole Woman’s Health.240 In Gee, the Fifth Circuit asserted
236. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10
(2016).
237. Cole, 790 F.3d at 588–89.
238. Id. at 2320 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
239. Id. at 2343 n.11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s holding, we
are supposed to use the same figure (women actually burdened) as both
the numerator and the denominator. By my math, that fraction is always
“1,” which is pretty large as fractions go.”). In Whole Woman’s Health v.
Cole, the Fifth Circuit made the same argument, claiming that this
approach, which was set forth by the plaintiffs on appeal, would “make
the large fraction test merely a tautology, always resulting in a large
fraction.” 790 F.3d at 589 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769
F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014)).
Justice Alito also criticized the majority’s failure to acknowledge that the
correct standard for facial challenges to abortion regulations was an “open
question.” Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2343 n.11 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
240. See, e.g., Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 320 F. Supp. 3d 828,
841 (S.D. Miss. 2018) (“Had the Hellerstedt Court wished to make that
dramatic departure, it could have simply said there is no longer a
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that the Whole Woman’s Health decision unambiguously adopted the
large-fraction test as the correct standard for facial challenges to
abortion restrictions, yet the majority opinion failed to clearly explain
“how to delimit the numerator and denominator to define the relevant
fraction,” thus leaving room for interpretation.241 The Fifth Circuit
proceeded to engage in the same type of numerical calculations that the
court had performed in the opinion overturned by Whole Woman’s
Health, using slightly more narrow populations as denominators so as
to “comply” with the Supreme Court’s directions.242 As the sole
dissenting judge pointed out, these types of “elaborate ‘mathematical’
calculations” are not required by Supreme Court precedent, as
“[n]either Casey nor [Whole Woman’s Health] calculated a numerical
fraction of women who would be burdened before invalidating statutory
provisions.”243
In Planned Parenthood of Arkansas & Eastern Oklahoma v.
Jegley,244 the Eighth Circuit also focused solely on the Whole Woman’s
Health’s articulation of the correct denominator, ignoring the fact that
the Court had facially invalidated the Texas regulations without
making numerical calculations. The Eighth Circuit vacated a district
court’s preliminary injunction of an Arkansas law targeting medication
abortion providers,245 holding that the district court had failed to
appropriately apply the large-fraction test.246 According to the Eighth
Circuit, the district court correctly defined the denominator, but
mistakenly “focused on amorphous groups of women to reach its
conclusion that the Act was facially unconstitutional.”247 The circuit
court remanded the case, directing the district court to first make
concrete estimations of the number of women who would forgo or
distinction between as-applied and facial attacks in the abortion context.
But its limited discussion of the issue never says that.”).
241. June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 802, 813 (5th Cir. 2018).
242. Id. at 813–15.
243. Id. at 832 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
244. 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2573 (2018).
245. The challenged law requires medication-abortion providers to contract
with a physician who has “active admitting privileges and
gynecological/surgical privileges at a hospital designated to handle any
emergencies associated with the use or ingestion of the abortion-inducing
drug.” Planned Parenthood Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley (Jegley I), No. 4:15CV-00784-KGB, 2016 WL 6211310, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 14,
2016), vacated and remanded Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v.
Jegley (Jegley II), 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
2573 (2018) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1504(d)). It also requires
providers to give medication-abortion patients the name and phone
number of the contracted physician and the hospital. Id.
246. Jegley II, 864 F.3d at 960–61.
247. Id. at 959.
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postpone a desired abortion because of the challenged regulation, and
then to determine “whether they constitute a ‘large fraction’ of women
seeking medication abortions in Arkansas.”248 The Court in Whole
Woman’s Health required no such calculations.
These decisions out of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits may claim to
adhere to the Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health, but
their application of the large-fraction test and balancing test contradict
both the word and the spirit of the majority opinion. It is not evident
that these courts would have ruled any differently if Justice Breyer’s
opinion had been devoid of any ambiguities regarding the correct
application of both tests. Perhaps these courts are attempting to narrow
the precedent set by Whole Woman’s Health by taking advantage of its
ambiguities, but the extent to which these decisions depart from a
logical interpretation of the decision suggests that the courts may be
hoping that a shift in the makeup of the Supreme Court will lead to a
different outcome on appeal.249
C. Fetal-Protective Restrictions

In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court assumed that
Texas’s interest in enacting the challenged H.B. 2 provisions was
protecting women’s health.250 Accordingly, while the majority opinion
provided a useful roadmap for analyzing and balancing the benefits and
burdens of woman-protective restrictions, the decision raised some
questions regarding the test’s applicability to fetal-protective
restrictions. To be clear, the Court’s description of the undue-burden
balancing test was not specific to woman-protective restrictions.251 In
fact, the Court supported its articulation of this test by citing Casey’s
application of a balancing test to a spousal-notification requirement and
a parental-notification requirement, neither of which were justified as
health protections.252 Regardless, states are now arguing that fetalprotective legislation should not be decided under the balancing test

248. Id. at 959–60.
249. For a general discussion of lower court decisions that narrow Supreme
Court precedent, see Richard M. Re, Legal Scholarship Highlight: When
Lower Courts Don’t Follow Supreme Court Precedent, SCOTUSblog (Oct.
18, 2016, 10:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/legal-scholarshiphighlight-when-lower-courts-dont-follow-supreme-court-precedent/ [https://
perma.cc/L225-RF9Y].
250. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016).
251. Id. at 2309 (“The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer.”).
252. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–901
(1992)).
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articulated in Whole Woman’s Health.253 Courts have rejected this
argument, either explicitly or implicitly by applying a similar balancing
test to fetal-protective regulations.254 However, only a few courts have
issued decisions pertaining to fetal-protective restrictions at this time,
and at least one court that applied a balancing test to woman-protective
abortion restrictions prior to Whole Woman’s Health believed that a
different test applied to fetal-protective abortion restrictions.255
Assuming that courts are expected to apply the same test, the
question becomes, how. Some fetal-protective restrictions are justified
by empirical assumptions or scientific claims, allowing for an easier
analysis of whether the restrictions actually further a legitimate
purpose.256 However, the benefits of other fetal-protective restrictions
may be much more difficult to measure. For example, courts may
struggle to measure the actual benefits of laws purporting to promote
respect for fetal life. Despite these potential difficulties, courts must
critically scrutinize how well a challenged abortion restriction actually

253. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State
Dep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting Indiana’s
argument “that the test for weighing abortion regulations differs
depending on the purpose of the statute and that Casey and Whole
Women’s Health [sic] establish different tests depending on the nature of
the regulation”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d
218, 228 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“According to [the Texas Department of State
Health Services], the Court should not balance the benefits and burdens
of regulations expressing respect for the life of the unborn. The Court
disagrees.”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 264 F. Supp. 3d 813, 820–
21 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
254. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 896 F.3d at 817
(explicitly rejecting Indiana’s argument that Whole Woman’s Health’s
balancing test did not apply to the state’s challenged ultrasound waiting
period requirement because it was a fetal-protective law); Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (“[Texas’s] argument [that]
a different test applies when the State expresses respect for the life of the
unborn is a work of fiction, completely unsupported by reading the
sections of Supreme Court opinions DSHS cites in context.”); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. A-16-CA-1300, slip op. at 10–13
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2018) (balancing the benefits and burdens of Texas’s
fetal disposition requirements).
255. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865
N.W.2d 252, 263 (Iowa 2015) (“The Court applies the undue burden test
differently depending on the state’s interest advanced by a statute or
regulation.”).
256. When considering challenges to laws based on fetal pain, for example,
courts can analyze the reliability of the evidence presented by both sides,
which would likely include scientific studies and testimony.
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advances this type of fetal-protective interest257—a task the Supreme
Court has previously been unwilling to take on.258
Weighing a challenged restriction’s fetal-protective benefits against
the burdens it places on the right to abortion poses additional
challenges. When analyzing woman-protective restrictions, the benefits
and burdens are often, but not always, “measured by the same unit—
women’s health.”259 This is not the case for fetal-protective restrictions.
Furthermore, the application of a legal balancing test necessarily
requires judges to “combin[e] value judgments and empirical judgments
on one scale, and weigh[] them against similar judgments on the other
scales.”260 In practice, balancing tests “allow[] [judges] maximum
flexibility with minimum accountability.”261 While these issues also arise
when judges balance the benefits and burdens of woman-protective
abortion restrictions, asking judges to weigh a restriction’s fetalprotective benefits against the burdens it imposes on the abortion
decision seemingly invites personal values and bias into the analysis on
a much greater scale. Judicial decision makers who identify with a
government defendant’s preference for childbirth over abortion may
weigh the benefits prong more heavily than those who value respect for
women’s reproductive choices.
D. Impermissible Purpose

Since the Supreme Court first articulated the undue-burden
standard in Casey, the Court has never invalidated an abortion
restriction based on impermissible purpose. In Whole Woman’s Health
v. Cole,262 the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court’s
determination that Texas enacted the ASC requirements for the
purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of women’s right
to abortion.263 The majority opinion in Whole Woman’s Health v.
257. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 338 F. Supp. 3d 606, 627–28
(W.D. Tex. 2018) (analyzing benefits of Texas law governing the
disposition of fetal tissue with claimed purpose of expressing respect for
potential human life).
258. In Gonzales, Justice Kennedy rejected the challengers’ argument that
banning D&X but not the standard D&E procedure did not actually
further any interest in promoting respect for fetal life because D&E can
be “as brutal, if not more, than [D&X].” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 160 (2007). But see id. at 181–82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing D&X from D&E).
259. Leah M. Litman, Response, Potential Life in the Doctrine, 95 Tex. L.
Rev. 204, 207 (2017).
260. Faigman, supra note 144, at 586.
261. Id.
262. 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
263. Id. at 584–86.
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Hellerstedt provides no direct insight into whether the district court’s
holding on purpose was proper.
The district court analyzed Texas’s purpose in enacting the
challenged restrictions, despite noting that a finding of impermissible
purpose was not necessary because the court had already determined
that the challenged provisions had the effect of imposing an undue
burden. The court “conclude[d], after examining the act and the context
in which it operates, that the ambulatory-surgical-center requirement
was intended to close existing licensed abortion clinics.”264 In support
of this conclusion, the court cited the requirement’s disparate and
arbitrary treatment of abortion clinics in comparison to other health
care facilities with ASC requirements, which the court found
particularly telling when considered against the lack of any credible
evidence of health benefits.265 The court also pointed to Texas’s
argument that women in certain areas of the state could easily travel
across the border to a clinic in New Mexico, where abortion clinics do
not have to meet similar surgical-center requirements. Accordingly, the
court reasoned that Texas’s argument was “disingenuous and
incompatible” with the state’s purported purpose of “protect[ing] the
health and safety of Texas women who seek abortions” but was
“perfectly congruent” if Texas’s “underlying purpose in enacting the
requirement was to reduce or eliminate abortion in parts or all of
Texas.”266
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s
determination of purpose was made in error, claiming that the plaintiffs
“failed to proffer competent evidence contradicting the legislature’s
statement of a legitimate purpose for H.B. 2.”267
The Supreme Court did not deal with this holding directly. In
analyzing whether the ASC requirement actually provided any healthrelated benefit, Justice Breyer discussed abortion clinics’ disparate
treatment under the requirement, pointing to the district court’s finding
that Texas grandfathers or waives the requirements in whole or part
for approximately two-thirds of non-abortion-clinic facilities that are
required by statute to comply but does not grandfather or waive
264. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 685 (W.D. Tex.
2014).
265. Id. Specifically, the court noted that “[t[he requirement’s implementing
rules specifically deny grandfathering or the granting of waivers to
previously licensed abortion providers. This is in contrast to the ‘frequent’
granting of some sort of variance from the standards which occur in the
licensing of nearly three-quarters of all licensed ambulatory surgical
centers in Texas.” Id.
266. Id. at 685–86.
267. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 585 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016).
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requirements for abortion clinics.268 The Court also pointed to evidence
that Texas does not impose surgical-center requirements on comparable
procedures with much greater mortality and complication rates.269 The
Court went as far as declaring that this evidence “indicate[s] that the
surgical center provision imposes ‘a requirement that simply is not
based on differences’ between abortion and other surgical procedures
‘that are reasonably related to’” Texas’s purported purpose of
“preserving women’s health.”270 While the Court’s analysis seems to
subtly imply that Texas did not enact this requirement with the goal
of protecting women’s health, the Court does not explicitly discuss the
purpose behind either of the challenged restrictions.
The majority’s silence on this issue seems like a missed opportunity.
While in this particular case the plaintiffs were able to provide plentiful
evidence of the challenged restrictions’ effects, future plaintiffs
challenging other abortion restrictions may not have access to such
strong evidence of effect. They may, however, be able to demonstrate
an impermissible purpose based on disparate treatment, legislative
history, and other relevant evidence. Presumably, it is not necessary to
apply the balancing test once such a purpose is found. While the
majority opinion did not rule out future analyses of the government’s
true purpose, its decision did not provide future plaintiffs with a strong
precedent to use in support of such an argument.

Conclusion
Whole Woman’s Health was a monumental decision because it
saved a woman’s right to have an abortion from becoming a right only
in theory, but not in fact. Some commentators, however, have
drastically overstated the decision’s ability to act as a shield against all
future attacks on a woman’s reproductive autonomy. Justice Breyer’s
articulation and application of the undue-burden balancing test
strengthened this standard of review to an extent, but ambiguities in
the decision left it vulnerable to manipulation.
Notably, the decision has not deterred legislatures across the
country from persistently passing new abortion restrictions. During
2017, the year after Whole Woman’s Health was decided, “19 states
adopt[ed] 63 new restrictions on abortion rights and access,” for the
“largest [total] number of abortion restrictions enacted in a year since
2013,” when Texas enacted H.B. 2.271 In addition to enacting regulations
268. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d
at 680–81).
269. Id.
270. Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973)).
271. Elizabeth Nash et al., Policy Trends in the States, 2017, Guttmacher
Inst. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2018/01/
policy-trends-states-2017 [https://perma.cc/BJ86-DNDR].
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that gradually chip away at abortion’s constitutional protections, states
have been increasingly passing blatantly unconstitutional abortion bans
with the overt goal of overturning Roe v. Wade.272 The strength of the
Whole Woman’s Health decision will be tested as challenges to these
abortion restrictions make their way through the courts. Even if the
current constitutional precedent remains intact, however, the
ambiguities in the Whole Woman’s Health decision may allow courts to
narrow its application and gut it of the protections it affords to abortion
access without overturning the decision outright.
Despite the Whole Woman’s Health’s weaknesses and its uncertain
future, the decision’s articulation of the undue-burden standard is what
reproductive rights advocates currently have to work with. A careful
reading of the decision provides helpful guidance to potential plaintiffs
regarding the types of evidence they should present in a challenge and
ways to address anticipated defenses. The decision should also inspire
continued research into the impacts of abortion restrictions that have
gone into effect, the safety of technological advances in reproductive
health, and other topics relevant to future litigation.
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272. See Elizabeth Nash et al., Radical Attempts to Ban Abortion Dominate
State Policy Trends in the First Quarter of 2019, Guttmacher Inst.
(Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/04/radicalattempts-ban-abortion-dominate-state-policy-trends-first-quarter-2019
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